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Nuclear accidents have the potential to lead to signiﬁcant off-site effects that require actions
to  minimise the radiological impacts on people. Such countermeasures may include shel-
tering, evacuation, restrictions on the sale of locally-grown food, and long-term relocation
of  the population amongst others. Countries with nuclear facilities draw up emergency pre-
paredness plans, and put in place such provisions as distributing instructions and iodine
prophylaxis to the local population. Their plans are applied in simulated exercises on a reg-
ular  basis. The costs associated with emergency preparedness and the safety provisions to
reduce the likelihood of an accident, and/or mitigate the consequences, are justiﬁed on the
basis  of the health risks and accident costs averted. There is, of course, only limited actual
experience to indicate the likely costs so that much of the costing of accidents is based on
calculations. This paper reviews the methodologies used, in particular the approach that has
been developed in the UK, to appraise the costs of a hypothetical nuclear accident. Results
of  analysing a hypothetical nuclear accident at a ﬁctitious reactor site within the United
Kingdom are discussed in relation to the accidents at Three Mile Island 2, Chernobyl and
Fukushima Dai-ichi.
©  2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Institution of Chemical
Engineers. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/).1.  Introduction
The accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi on March 11 2011 has once
again brought to the foreground the potential costs of large
nuclear accidents. As of January 30 2015, TEPCO has paid out
¥4.64 trillion (US$38.9 billion) in compensation (TEPCO, 2015)
and recent estimates suggest that decontamination and ren-
ovation of the affected areas will total ¥7.81 trillion (US$65.9
billion) (The Reconstruction Agency, 2015). This compares
with the smaller accident at Three Mile Island 2, where US$71
million was paid in compensation with additional clean-up
costs totalling US$975 million (Strawn, 2013), and the larger
∗ Corresponding author. Current address: NSG Environmental Ltd.,
Festival House, Jessop Avenue, Cheltenham GL50 3SH, UK.
E-mail addresses: stephen.ashley@nsgconsultancy.com,
sfashley@physics.org (S.F. Ashley).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2017.08.032
0957-5820/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of
under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).accident at Chernobyl where losses have been estimated in
the region of hundreds of billions of dollars (IAEA, 2002).1
Multi-billion dollar accidents away from the nuclear sector
are, of course, not unknown. For example, the 2010 acci-
dent at BP’s Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico caused 11
immediate fatalities and the resulting pollution incident is
expected to cost the company ∼US$55 billion on current esti-
mates (Heffron et al., 2016 and references therein). Moreover
it is worth bearing in mind, for comparison purposes, that
the Great East Japan Earthquake killed over 19,000 people
and its cost, excluding nuclear damage, has so far totalled
¥25.6 trillion (US$215 billion) (Ministry of Finance Japan, 2015).
Nevertheless, the high cost of a large-scale nuclear accident
1 It is noted that these costs have not been adjusted to present-
day monetary values.
 Institution of Chemical Engineers. This is an open access article
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PSA application that works seamlessly as part of the Geo-aises the question of the adequacy of current nuclear liability
egimes and whether these can provide sufﬁcient recompense
or the people and businesses affected (Heffron et al., 2016).
he research presented here examines the cost of a severe
uclear reactor accident, which is assumed to take place at a
ypothetical site in southern England.
Methods have been established that, when coupled to a
robabilistic safety assessment (PSA), can provide an insight
nto the cost of a nuclear accident, as discussed further in
ection 2. Whilst these methods are generally useful for
etermining direct costs, indirect and intangible costs have
ypically been much harder to ascertain. At present, a signif-
cant amount of research is being undertaken to understand
hese further, most notably the OECD’s Expert Group on Costs
f Nuclear Accidents, Liability Issues and their Impact on Elec-
ricity Costs (EG-COSTNA). See OECD-NEA (2014).
The work described in this paper aims to provide further
nsight into the direct and indirect costs of a nuclear accident,
y using the latest Level-3 Probabilistic Safety Assessment
ode “PACE
®
” coupled to an economic costing model “COCO-2”
o appraise the costs of a hypothetical nuclear accident within
he United Kingdom. Section 2 provides a brief overview of
robabilistic Safety Assessments and associated Cost Method-
logies. Section 3 outlines a hypothetical nuclear accident at
 ﬁctitious reactor site within the United Kingdom that is
ssessed using PACE, with the results of these simulations pro-
ided in Section 4. The results are discussed in Section 5 in
erms of the accidents at Three Mile Island 2, Chernobyl and
ukushima Dai-ichi; comparable accidents from a modern Gen
II+ reactor and a brief consideration of future calculations
hich could be performed by PACE to assess countermea-
ure interventions, and corresponding economic costs, across
urope.
.  Probabilistic  safety  assessments  and
ost  methodologies
robabilistic safety assessments (PSAs) are used throughout
he nuclear industry to assess the risks of an accident occur-
ing at a nuclear facility. These assessments are typically split
nto three ‘levels’ when considering nuclear reactors. Level-1
SAs aim to determine the various fault modes that can occur
ithin a nuclear power plant and then assign a probability to
ach of these events happening. Level-2 PSAs builds on the
esults of Level-1 PSAs to look at the release modes of mate-
ials from the site (i.e. to assess how containment and other
itigating systems operate) and as a result estimate the activ-
ties of materials potentially released. Level-3 PSAs build on
he results of Level-2 PSAs to look at off-site consequences,
uch as the risk to the public. It should be noted that this sim-
le connection between levels may not be sufﬁcient; at some
acilities Level-2 initiators may not require a Level-1 event to
ave occurred (e.g. fuelling machine failures in on-load refu-
lling scenarios in some reactor systems) and there may be
ypass routes that mean releases occur without invoking con-
ainment behaviour. Level-3 PSA should cover all events on a
ite, including those due to other sources of hazard associated
ith each facility, such as spent fuel ponds at a reactor facility
nd, for multi-facility sites, those due to other facilities having
nock-on effects or a single event affecting several facilities
y, for example, the manifestation of a large external hazard.
he terminology of three levels has little relevance to other
ypes of nuclear facility, but the concept of developing off-siteconsequences from faults leading to releases of activity still
holds.
As this work is speciﬁcally geared to the consequences of
off-site exposure and contamination, only Level-3 PSAs will
be detailed further in this section. For further information on
Level-1 and Level-2 PSAs, the reader is referred to IAEA (2010a,
2010b).
The history of the development of Level-3 PSAs is sum-
marised in OECD-NEA (2000). Bexon (2008) concluded that
there had been no signiﬁcant developments in Level-3 PSAs
since the 1990s, with the majority of codes using a Gaussian
plume representation of atmospheric dispersion processes to
model the transport of radionuclides. Typically, various mod-
ules that simulate the implementation of countermeasures
to reduce the radiological consequences to people and the
environment2 are built into these models.
By 2000, four main costing models were in operation
around the world that were either embedded within, or other-
wise coupled to, these Level-3 PSA codes. These are: ARANO
developed by VTT in Finland; MACCS developed by Sandia
National Laboratory in the United States; COCO-1 that was
coupled to either CONDOR or COSYMA and developed by
the National Radiological Protection Board (now Public Health
England) in the UK; and MECA  that was coupled to COSYMA
and developed at Universidade Politécnica de Madrid. Further
details on the differences between ARANO, MACCS, COCO-
1, and MECA; and their application in assessing the external
costs of electricity are provided in OECD-NEA (2000).
An updated version of MACCS, “MACCS2” (current version
3.10) has been released (US Department of Energy, 2004) and is
the standard US Level-3 PSA code (Sandia National Laboratory,
2012). MACCS uses a Gaussian plume model to calculate the
atmospheric transport and deposition of radionuclides follow-
ing an accidental release, with those results used in turn as
an input to the calculation of doses to people from multiple
pathways. MACCS allows various doses to be calculated with
and without protective actions including, for example, the use
of a network representation of how particular groups in the
population might evacuate the area near to the accident site.
MACCS is used in cost-beneﬁt analyses that form part of the
U.S. licensing processes using a simple cost based economic
model however, a new “Input-Output” economic model for
MACCS is currently under development.
Within the UK COCO-1 was superseded by COCO-2 in 2008
(Higgins et al., 2008). COCO-1 estimated costs based on the
regionalised GDP per head lost due to movement  restrictions
on, or displacement of, the local population. COCO-2 uses an
“Input-Output” model to determine the direct and indirect
(Type I) national production loss from curtailed activities in
the affected region together with capital losses in the affected
region and a willingness to pay valuation of health effect costs
(indicative Type II regional tourism loss estimates are also pro-
vided).
Public Health England is completing the development of a
new Level-3 PSA application called PACE (Probabilistic Acci-
dent Consequence Evaluation) (Charnock et al., 2013). The
developers of PACE have taken advantage of advances in com-
puting technology, such as increased processing power and
the greater availability of spatial datasets, to produce a Level-32 And to a limited extent indicate some of the effects these pro-
tective actions have on the environment.
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Fig. 1 – Map  outlining the locality of the hypothetical nuclear power plant chosen in this study. Data taken from HM
HM GGovernment (2014). Rural/urban classiﬁcation as deﬁned in 
graphic Information System, ArcGISTM. PACE provides many
new features including the use of NAME III (Jones et al.,
2007a) a Lagrangian dispersion model that utilises numerical
weather data to model radionuclide dispersion. In addition,
PACE calculations can also be performed with a much sim-
pler Gaussian dispersion model.3 A discussion of the practical
differences between these dispersion models can be found in
Haywood (2011). PACE estimates the size, number, or extent
of the accident consequences stemming from the release of
radioactivity into the environment such as the number of peo-
ple evacuated or sheltered, the number affected by immediate
and latent health effects, and the amount of agricultural pro-
duction restricted. Many  of these PACE results are also inputs
to the COCO-2 model implemented within PACE that estimates
the economic costs of the predicted consequences.3 Gaussian dispersion models treat the dispersed pollutant as
having a Gaussian distribution, (i.e. a normal probability distribu-
tion). Lagrangian dispersion models treat the dispersed pollutant
as  individual packets (i.e. particles) that move via a random walk in
the atmosphere. A discussion of the practical differences between
these dispersion models can be found in Haywood (2011).overnment (2013).
3.  Using  PACE  to  model  a  hypothetical  large
accident  in  the  UK
A set of calculations were performed to investigate the use
of PACE and in particular to estimate the economic cost of
a hypothetical large accident occurring in the UK using the
COCO-2 model. The following sections highlight the perti-
nent details that were required to set-up the calculations,
including: the location of the reactor, the size and timing of
the released source term, the sampled weather conditions,
and the countermeasure options adopted in the calculations.
Further details of the parameters and options selected are
discussed in Higgins and Sherwood (2017).
3.1.  Hypothetical  reactor  location  and  geography
The siting of a nuclear reactor requires a number of factors
to be considered including the proximity of rural and urban
settlements, accessibility of cooling water and access to grid
connections, as detailed further in Grimston et al. (2014).
The location of the notional nuclear reactor used in this
study was deliberately chosen not to be the position of a cur-
rently operating reactor, or a site that would be plausible for a
future reactor, as the intention was to explore general effects
rather than those associated with a particular site. Hence a
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Table 1 – Source term considered for this hypothetical large accident. Time intervals are labelled “Phases” for ease of
subsequent reference.
Activity of the release (Bq)
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Total
Cumulative duration (h) 2 3 4 5 6
Noble gases 133Xe – 1.50 × 1018 4.50 × 1018 4.50 × 1018 1.50 × 1018 1.2 × 1019
Halogens 131I – 1.25 × 1016 3.75 × 1016 3.75 × 1016 1.25 × 1016 1.0 × 1017
132I – 1.88 × 1016 5.63 × 1016 5.63 × 1016 1.88 × 1016 1.5 × 1017
Alkali metals 134Cs – 1.88 × 1014 5.63 × 1014 5.63 × 1014 1.88 × 1014 1.5 × 1015
137Cs – 1.25 × 1014 3.75 × 1014 3.75 × 1014 1.25 × 1014 1.0 × 1015
Alkali earths 90Sr – 1.25 × 1013 3.75 × 1013 3.75 × 1013 1.25 × 1013 1.0 × 1014
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ypothetical site was chosen on the South Downs, at Ordnance
urvey grid coordinates SU85202360 (Lat: 51.005, Lon: −0.786),
lacing it approximately 4 km from the centre of Midhurst. The
election of an inland site means there is a greater opportunity
or people and businesses to be affected than at a site on the
oast where, at least under some meteorological conditions, a
elease may initially head out to sea. The population density
ear the nuclear power station is presented in Fig. 1. Although
he siting follows the normal conventions of having relatively
ew people living nearby, its position in the south east of the
K means that it is relatively close to large conurbations. This
s likely to magnify the consequences of a major accident over
hat anticipated for more  remote locations.
The PACE runs that were undertaken in this work relied
n a nested grid comprising an inner grid of 1 km per side, fol-
owed by grids of 4 km,  16 km and 48 km per side. The inner grid
xtends over an area of 24 km east–west by 20 km north–south
hile the next largest grid extends 128 km east–west and
12 km north–south. The grid size was determined by the
ssessment required in each area. Thus, ﬁner resolution grids,
entred round the hypothetical nuclear power plant, were
sed in areas where emergency countermeasures such as
heltering and evacuation are more  likely, with progressively
ower resolution grids adopted for long and short term agri-
ultural restrictions, and far-ﬁeld collective dose effects.
.2.  Source  term
n this work, a representative source term for a severe “Beyond
esign Basis Accident” for a generic water-cooled reactor tech-
ology with a low likelihood of occurring is considered4 and
s presented in Table 1. This particular source term does not
epresent any speciﬁc accident sequence from either an actual
ccident or any other Level-2 PSA calculation. Comparisons of
he source term in Table 1 to the source terms associated with
he accidents at Chernobyl and Fukushima Dai-ichi and also
o probabilistic accident sequences associated with AREVA’s
uropean Pressurised Reactor (EPR) are discussed in Section
.3.
The radionuclides considered when calculating the con-
equences of a release from the plant are shown in Table 1.
he pre-release duration is assumed to be two hours, with the
elease then occurring over a period of four hours. The release
4 As described further in Section 5.3, the model release is not
he  result of a known fault sequence of a particular reactor
esign, but is similar to a release with an estimated frequency
etween 10−7 and 10−8 per reactor year from AREVA’s EPR, based
n a full-scope Level-2 PSA (AREVA and EDF Energy, 2012).3.75 × 10 3.75 × 10 1.25 × 10 1.0 × 10
phase is assumed to split into four one-hour periods, forming
a ﬂat-topped triangular distribution, with the peak emission
occurring midway through the release.
A limited number of radionuclides are used in this partic-
ular scoping assessment to minimise (a) the time required to
run the NAME III dispersion model (as described in Section
3.3); (b) the time required to run the corresponding PACE cal-
culations; and (c) limit the complexity and speciﬁcity of the
results provided. In addition, to keep the discharge as simple
as possible, the release was assumed to occur from a single
point source with a single effective release height of 40 m.
3.3.  Weather  data  and  the  NAME  III  model
The NAME  III model (Jones et al., 2007a) used by PACE to
model atmospheric dispersion uses numerical weather pre-
diction (NWP) data from the UK MET Ofﬁce. In particular, the
mesoscale NWP  data used in the study has a ground reso-
lution of 12 km by 12 km,  extends beyond the boundaries of
the UK and is divided into 31 vertical levels with a maximum
height of 19 km.  Higher resolution data are available but were
not thought appropriate for use in this scoping assessment.
PACE ran the NAME III model 400 times, sampling two years
of hourly numerical weather data every 65 h, within a tempo-
ral domain of 48 h (i.e. dispersion was modelled for a further
42 h after the release ﬁnished to ensure that the whole release
was allowed to disperse fully over the UK) to establish the
likely distribution of consequences. Each run tracked the tra-
jectories of 2000 particles per hour, to ﬁt with the temporal
resolution of the meteorological data. The use of only 400 runs
may have slightly reduced the accuracy of the results gener-
ated at high percentiles as very infrequent events may not
have been included.
3.4.  Countermeasures  and  intervention  levels
Various countermeasures can be employed in the various
phases of an accident to ensure optimal protection of the pop-
ulation under the prevailing accident circumstances. In this
work, we  consider short-term countermeasures that are insti-
gated at the start of the pre-release phase (i.e. at “time zero” in
this assessment), and long-term countermeasures instigated
once the release has ﬁnished and has been fully dispersed (i.e.
42 h after the release in this assessment).
As presented in the upper part of Table 2, short-term
countermeasures include: sheltering, iodine prophylaxis, and
evacuation. In the United Kingdom, guidance on the use of
countermeasures is based on the principle of ‘averted dose’,
i.e. the dose prevented by the application of a countermeasure
or set of countermeasures. These are embodied in Emergency
100  Process Safety and Environmental Protection 1 1 2 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 96–113
Table 2 – Intervention levels used in this work to mimic  UK ERLs (and their efﬁcacy) within PACE. Throughout the work,
bold text denotes the lower intervention level (LIL) and italicised text denotes the upper intervention level (UIL).
Countermeasure Dose criteria Comment
LIL UIL
Sheltering 6 mSv (effective),
60 mSv thyroid
60  mSv (effective),
600 mSv thyroid
This  assumes sheltering to be approximately 50%
effective at reducing the inhalation hazard. The
actual ERLs seek to avert 3 mSv or 30 mSv of
effective dose respectively.
Evacuation 30 mSv (effective),
300 mSv thyroid
300 mSv (effective),
3000 mSv thyroid
There is a short warning period (see Table 1) and it is
assumed that as a result evacuation can be 100%
effective.
Stable iodine (inhalation) 30 mSv thyroid 300 mSv thyroid Assumed to be 100% effective if taken 0.25 h before
the plume arrives. Distributed to 50 km and taken
2.5 h after start of event.
Relocation 10 mSv y−1 10 mSv y−1 Single criterion for both trials. The current
calculations assume that permanent relocation
applies to the group of people who would not be
able to return to the affected area within three
months of the release (i.e. after 90 days, the
projected dose annual rate would still be above
10 mSv per year) while those temporarily relocatedReference Levels (ERLs) which represent lower and upper
bounds of averted dose for enacting various countermeasures.
Below the lower bound, the countermeasure is unlikely to
be justiﬁed (it may do more  harm than good); at the upper
bound, the countermeasure would almost always be justiﬁed.
Between the lower and upper bounds, countermeasures may
be applied which take account of the difﬁculties imposed by
external factors such as extreme weather to adjust the balance
of beneﬁts toward slightly higher trigger doses.
PACE utilises user-deﬁned single-value (projected dose or
activity concentrations when considering food) intervention
levels to trigger the use of countermeasures. This differs from
the ERLs, where a range of values may be used for each
countermeasure. In this work, two separate calculations have
been performed: one considers a lower intervention level (LIL)
which is analogous to the lower ERL bound, the other consid-
ers an upper intervention level (UIL) which is analogous to the
upper ERL bound.
The values for LILs and UILs for sheltering and evacua-
tion are taken from the current ERLs, which are described
further in NRPB (1990). It should be noted that whilst shel-
tering inside a building reduces the dose received from cloud
and ground shine, the additional population level beneﬁt of
instructing people to shelter is likely to be relatively small for
these exposure pathways, as most people already spend most
of their time indoors. The dominant population level effect
of actively sheltering (closing windows and trying as much as
possible to reduce the ventilation rate) is therefore to reduce
the dose received via the inhalation pathway. However, for
those individuals who  are outside when sheltering is initiated
the greatest relative beneﬁts are likely to be the protection
from ground shine and, for the period of plume passage, cloud
shine. In summary, sheltering is assumed to be 50% effective
(i.e. the trigger projected dose used by PACE is set at 6 mSv  in
the expectation of averting 3 mSv  the advised LIL, and simi-
larly the advised upper bound projected dose intervention is
set to 60 mSv  to avert the 30 mSv  UIL), whereas evacuation is
assumed to be 100% effective (30 mSv  for LIL and 300 mSv  for
UIL) and the advised averted values can be applied directly.would be able to return.
For iodine prophylaxis, the short two-hour period between
the triggering event and the release may compromise the abil-
ity to supply potassium iodate tablets to all those that would
beneﬁt. Furthermore, it was assumed that if stable iodine was
consumed at least 15 min  before the plume arrived, then the
prophylactic was 100% effective. However, PACE assumes an
exponential decline in the effectiveness of tablets if admin-
istration is delayed beyond this time. The population within
the detailed emergency planning zone (DEPZ) surrounding the
hypothetical site of the release is assumed to have imme-
diate access to potassium iodate tablets, which have been
pre-distributed, as part of the site emergency plan. However,
as PACE does not currently support the triggering of prophy-
laxis at multiple times, a compromise assumption is required
to accommodate the time taken to make tablets available
to those requiring them beyond the DEPZ which inevitably
underestimates the potential protection afforded to those
within the DEPZ. In summary, to account for the variation in
the likely delay before stable iodine is available to all those
that may require it, potassium iodate was assumed to be pre-
distributed to a radius of 50 km from the site, but with the
condition that the prophylactic is then only consumed 2.5 h
after the start of the event.
Long-term countermeasures in this work consist of tempo-
rary relocation and permanent relocation triggered by a single
intervention level of 10 mSv  per year, applied for both LIL and
UIL at the end of the emergency phase. The current calcula-
tions assume that permanent relocation applies to the group
of people who would not be able to return to the affected area
within three months of the release (i.e. after 90 days, the pro-
jected dose annual rate would still be above 10 mSv  per year)
while those temporarily relocated would be able to return.
PACE allows longer periods of temporary accommodation to
be selected, before assuming permanent relocation and the
writing off of assets. A longer period of temporary relocation
period before declaring assets lost is likely to reduce costs.
In terms of agricultural countermeasures, intervention lev-
els based on the EU’s Community Food Intervention Level
(European Commission, 1998) were adopted. Furthermore, two
decontamination options available within PACE were con-
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hidered (Higgins and Sherwood, 2017). As mentioned in the
K Recovery Handbook for Radiation Incidents (Public Health
ngland, 2015) there are many  potential decontamination
ptions that could be considered following an accident and
his choice is likely to have a large effect on decontamination
osts.
.5.  Data  used  within  the  PACE  calculation
he default input information that PACE uses has a resolu-
ion of 1 km2 for all data types except agriculture which has a
esolution of 4 km2.
Population data is based from the 2001 Census (Ofﬁce for
ational Statistics, 2003), and economic data is provided from
he results of the 2008 COCO-2 model. Depending on the site
f the reactor, the data is recast as appropriate to constrain
he number of required calculations. The main sources of eco-
omic data used by COCO-2 are detailed in Table 20 of Higgins
t al. (2008).
Not all cost contributions can be fully captured with
he analysis performed by PACE and the integral economic
ssessment model, COCO-2. The analysis results presented
n Section 4 illustrate various direct and indirect component
osts that are available from PACE. It also highlights what addi-
ional factors might be considered to provide a broader cost
erspective and the likely effect that might have on the over-
ll cost of an accident. The COCO-2 cost baseline is currently
004 and this baseline has been used in this work. Ideally, a
ore  current baseline would be desirable. However, with the
nevitable delay before the required data becomes available, it
s unlikely that the primary calculations carried out at the end
f 2014 could have applied data newer than 2012. The change
n real terms in GDP between 2004 and 2012 is less than 6%
Ofﬁce for National Statistics, 2013) which is very small both
istorically and on the basis of the likely level of uncertainty
n the calculations undertaken. Thus, the relative impact of an
ccident can be gauged either on the basis of the 2004 baseline
conomy or, if desired, by applying a simple GDP deﬂator, such
s the one published by the UK Treasury (HM Government,
015) to the estimated costs to provide an approximate result
ith respect to a new baseline.
.  Results
esults of the PACE calculations undertaken, as outlined in
able 1, and modelled under the two countermeasure regimes
upper and lower ERLs) detailed in Table 2 are reported in
his section. The results demonstrate the physical conse-
uences in terms of the disruption to the local population and
nvironment most directly affected by the accident and the
ountermeasures imposed. The results also include an assess-
ent of the health consequences and the economic effects
f the disruption. Section 4.1 outlines the number of people
hat would be subjected to various countermeasures and their
ssociated costs. Section 4.2 looks at the expected radiological
ffects in the population under various assumptions and con-
itions (and their corresponding costs). Section 4.3 looks at the
gricultural losses both in terms of the quantity of lost produce
nd the corresponding economic cost. Section 4.4 provides an
verall summary of the results.
The results from the PACE and COCO-2 calculations are
resented within the general constraints of the COCO-2
odel. COCO-2 assumes economic recovery at a national level
appens quite quickly following an accident with affectedbusinesses resuming activities in the area, relocating to else-
where in the country or having their output replaced by other
UK businesses; although it is noted that local effects may per-
sist for much longer.
4.1.  Population  affected
Table 3 illustrates the highly variable consequences of an
accidental release depending on weather conditions, with
potentially large numbers affected at very high percentiles.
Whilst very large numbers are required to shelter at very high
percentiles, with the numbers expected to evacuate possibly
exceeding the practical capacity of the authorities to organise
and manage effectively in the short time available, the num-
bers requiring permanent relocation are more  manageable.
Permanent relocation in this calculation is deﬁned as those
living in areas where the dose over a year will continue to
exceed the dose criterion for relocation after more  than 90
days; although those scheduled to relocate permanently are
assumed to stay in temporary accommodation for two years.
As outlined in Table 2, the criterion for relocation is 10 mSv
per year for both the lower and the upper intervention levels.
The corresponding economic costs associated with sheltering,
evacuation and relocation of people that directly impacts the
economy are presented in Table 4 .
Fig. 2 is a probability map  that shows the likelihood of
the population having to shelter assuming the application
of either the lower or the upper intervention levels. The
difference between the geographical areas affected by the
implementation of the lower intervention level on the one
hand and the upper intervention level on the other is rather
striking, especially in the number of people affected.
Fig. 3 shows a probability map  of the areas where evacu-
ation would be advised for both the lower intervention level
and upper intervention level. From Fig. 3, the large extent of
the area potentially affected has a signiﬁcant effect on the
likely cost of evacuation (as observed in the range of short-
term accommodation costs in Table 4). It is important to note
that, at least for short duration releases, a countermeasure
may be advised at locations particular to a given meteorologi-
cal sequence. Thus it is possible that some low probability grid
squares will be identiﬁed for evacuation, while others are not,
depending on the sequence.
Fig. 4 shows a percentile map  of the areas where temporary
evacuation would be advised. While evacuation for 90 days or
less might affect a large area, the ﬁgure indicates that only a
small area would require long-term relocation.
In summary, for the lower intervention level, the mean
numbers of those who would be advised to shelter, take
prophylactic iodine tablets (PITs) and evacuate are 410,000,
360,000, and 44,000 respectively. For the upper intervention
level, the mean numbers of those affected is generally an
order of magnitude lower; i.e. 13,000 would be advised to shel-
ter, 42,000 would be advised to take PITs, and 1500 would
be advised to evacuate. The mean numbers of people who
would be advised to either temporarily relocate or perma-
nently relocate are 12,000 and 620 respectively, under the
single relocation criteria considered. To put these numbers in
context 3.5 million people live within 50 km of the hypothet-
ical reactor site. The difference in the mean economic costs
to the people and businesses between the lower and upper
intervention levels is ∼£50 million.
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Table 3 – The cumulative distribution of the population predicted to require sheltering, iodine prophylaxis, evacuation
and relocation following the hypothetical nuclear accident considered in this work. The table includes results for the
lower intervention level (shown in bold text under ‘LIL’) and the upper intervention level (shown in italicised text under
‘UIL’) as described in Table 2.
Sample percentile Sheltered Taking PITsa Evacuated Temporary
relocationb
Permanent
relocationc
Area perm.
relocated (km2)
UIL LIL UIL LIL UIL LIL UIL&LIL UIL&LIL UIL&LIL
5th 450 36,000 1500 89,000 69 1600 310 – –
25th 2400 110,000 8100 190,000 180 8600 1500 – –
50th 7000 260,000 24,000 320,000 540 26,000 4600 24 1.0
75th 17,000 510,000 48,000 480,000 1800 51,000 12,000 100 2.0
95th 42,000 1,300,000 140,000 810,000 6600 150,000 36,000 2300 24
Mean 13,000 410,000 42,000 360,000 1500 44,000 12,000 620 4.4
Maximum 160,000 3,900,000 390,000 1,200,000 8100 390,000 300,000 41,000 100
a PITs refers to potassium iodine/iodate tablets, which block the uptake of radioiodine by the thyroid. In the UK they are in form of potassium
iodate (KIO3) tablets.
b Measured from end of emergency phase.
c The population permanently relocated is deﬁned as those in areas where the dose over a year will continue to exceed the dose criterion for
relocation after more than 90 days; although those scheduled to relocate permanently are assumed to stay in temporary accommodation for
two years.
Table 4 – The cumulative distribution of the economic costs predicted for people and businesses arising from the
hypothetical nuclear accident and disruption to normal life from the applied countermeasures. The table includes results
for the lower intervention level (shown in bold text) and the upper intervention level (shown in italicised text) as
described in Table 2.
Sample percentile Accommodation
costs (£M)
Household assets
loss (£M)
Production losses
(£M)
Business capital
loss (£M)
Decon. (£M) Total
(£M)a
Short Long Temp Perm Direct Indirect Buildings Equipment
5th (UIL/LIL)
0.14 – 0.0035 – 0.16  0.11 – – 0.0009
0.41
0.19 0.0046 2.8 1.8 5.0
25th (UIL/LIL)
0.55 – 0.013 – 0.97  0.65 – – 0.0026
2.4
0.79 0.023 9.0 6.1 20
50th (UIL/LIL)
1.4
6.3
0.042
0.12
3.2  2.2
0.11 0.13 0.0059
12
1.9 0.075 22 15 51
75th (UIL/LIL)
2.7
13
0.14
0.49
9.1  5.9
0.22 0.25 0.011
34
3.9 0.19 41 27 97
95th (UIL/LIL)
7.3
270
0.37
9.6
54  35
6.6 8.3 0.026
390
8.4 0.41 120 81 470
Mean (UIL/LIL)
2.7
58
0.13
2.6
15  10
2.4  4.2 0.011
96
3.3 0.16 40 27 140
Max. (UIL/LIL) 60  2700
3.6
160
530  390
150 500 0.17 4000
3.7 560 410
Abbreviations: “Short” = short-term accommodation costs. Population can return to their homes in 90 days or less; “Long” = long-term accom-
modation costs. Population housed in temporary accommodation for two years and then moved to new permanent accommodation;
“Temp” = temporary loss of household assets; “Perm” = permanent loss of household assets; “Decon” = decontamination costs.
a The percentile results of this column are derived independently and without reference to other percentile columns (See Section 4).4.2.  Health  effects
Table 5 summarises the health effects arising from this hypo-
thetical accident, with Table 6 summarising the health costs
(associated with both mortality and morbidity). It is noted
from Table 2 that, when invoked, evacuation is 100% effec-
tive. This assumption idealises this aspect of the response to
the accident. Further details on the speciﬁc aspects of the cost
methodology used in this study for health costs, such as dis-
count rates, are contained in Higgins et al. (2008) and Higgins
and Sherwood (2017). The results presented do not employ a
cut-off or threshold dose below which the individual risk of
developing a long-term health effect is deemed insigniﬁcant.
This is in accord with the IAEA’s Basic Safety Standards where
“it is assumed that the probability of the eventual occurrenceof a stochastic effect is proportional to the dose received, with
no threshold” (IAEA, 2014).
It should be stressed that the estimated fatalities in Table 5
are statistical deaths predicted and valued for prevention,
planning and optimising the response to potential accidents.
As indicated in Section 4.1, the use of upper interven-
tion levels to trigger the countermeasure response greatly
reduces the numbers of people required to shelter and, more
importantly from a practical perspective, evacuate. The dif-
ference may amount to a change from the impractical to the
practicable. Clearly, the reduction in the practical difﬁculties
and potential health consequences that stem from moving
fewer people coupled with the lower cost of organising the
transport and services required to move and then reunite the
local community, for example children and parents, should
be weighed against the increase in radiation related health
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Fig. 2 – Probability maps of where sheltering is advised for (a) lower intervention levels; and (b) upper intervention levels.
Intervention levels are detailed in Table 2.
Fig. 3 – Probability maps of where evacuation is advised for (a) lower intervention levels; and (b) upper intervention levels.
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ffects and their associated costs (Murakami et al., 2015).
mplementing the upper intervention level rather than the
ower intervention level does not lead to a dramatic rise in
ealth effects. For example, the mean number of radiation-
nduced cancer incidences over all ages and all time is 1500
or the lower intervention level and 2000 for the upper inter-vention level. However, the corresponding difference in the
mean total health cost between the upper and lower inter-
vention levels is £60 million which more  than cancels out the
difference in the mean economic costs to people and busi-
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Fig. 4 – 95th percentile map  of the spatial and temporal extent of the zone within which the population would be advised to
relocate. As noted in Table 2, permanent relocation applies to the group of people who would not be able to return to the
affected area within three months of the release (i.e. after 90 days, the projected dose annual rate would still be above
10 mSv  per year) while those temporarily relocated would be able to return.
Table 5 – The cumulative distribution of people predicted to suffer radiologically-induced health effects due to the
hypothetical nuclear accident and corresponding countermeasures. The table includes results for the lower intervention
level (shown in bold text) and the upper intervention level (shown in italicised text) as described in Table 2.
Sample percentile Early
fatalities
Non-fatal
reactionsa
Hereditary
effects
Leukaemia
fatalities
Solid  cancer
fatalities
Cancer
fatalitiesb
Leukaemia
incidencec
Solid cancer
incidence
Cancer
incidenceb
5th (UIL/LIL) –  –
4.2  4.7 47 52 4.7 260 270
4.1 4.6 33 39 4.6 100 110
25th (UIL/LIL) –  –
10
12
130  140
12
660  670
9.8 98 110 370 390
50th (UIL/LIL) –  –
25
27
290  320
27
1500 1500
24 250 280 940 980
75th (UIL/LIL) –  –
56  62 640 710 62 2700 2800
55 61 590 650 61 2200 2300
95th (UIL/LIL) –  – 150 190
1600 1800
190
5700 5800
1500 1700 4800 4900
Mean (UIL/LIL) – –
45  53 470 520 53 2000 2000
44 52 430 480 52 1500 1500
Max. (UIL/LIL) – – 480  320
2700
3000  320
9000 9200
2600 7200 7400
a The number of non-fatal reactions are estimated to be zero in all cases except for the maximum. For the maximum case, the expected number
of fatalities is not zero but is very much below 1 and has hence not been shown.
b The percentile results of this column are derived independently and without reference to other percentile columns (See Section 4).
c PACE assumes a lethality fraction of 1; this conservative assumption is currently under review.nesses, mentioned in Section 4.1, although the two types of
cost accrue over very different timescales.5
4.3.  Agricultural  costs
The material and economic losses following the imposition
of agricultural restrictions are shown in Table 7. The material
losses represent the current and estimated future lost produc-
tion due to restrictions placed on the sale of food assuming
the land continued to be farmed in the same way. As men-
5 That is the economic costs to people and businesses are
typically accrued in the subsequent weeks and months following
an  accident, whereas health costs are typically accrued over the
years and decades following an accident.tioned in Section 6, all restrictions are assumed imposed at
the current activity levels for restricting the sale of food speci-
ﬁed by the EU (European Commission, 1998). Table 7 shows the
total time integrated loss of production from the areas affected
after the accident. It provides a measure of the food supply
that must be replaced following an accident either through
the development of alternative resources within the UK  or by
the purchase of food on world markets. Further details on how
PACE accounts for agricultural costs in these calculations are
provided in Higgins and Sherwood (2017). The costs shown in
Table 7 account for the value of lost production over at most
two years; at which point production elsewhere is assumed to
have replaced the lost supply, at least in value to the economy
if not in kind.The mean total cost to the agricultural sector is £130
million, but without assuming a particular deployment of
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Table 6 – The cumulative distribution of the economic costs predicted for those who suffer radiologically-induced health
effects due to the hypothetical nuclear accident and corresponding countermeasures. The table includes results for the
lower intervention level (shown in bold text) and the upper intervention level (shown in italicised text) as described in
Table 2.
Sample
percentile
Early
fatalities
(£M)
Non-fatal
reactionsa
(£M)
Hereditary
effectsb (£M)
Additional cost for
cancer fatalitiesc
(£M)
Cost  for cancer
incidence (£M)
Total
health
costd,e
(£M)
Leukaemia Solid
cancers
Totald Leukaemia Solid
cancers
Totald
5th (UIL/LIL) – –
3.5  4.5 36 41 0.39 16 17 64
3.3 4.4 25 31 0.38 6.4 6.9 43
25th (UIL/LIL) – –
9.1  12 99 110 1.0 41 42 170
8.7 11 76 91 0.99 23 24 130
50th (UIL/LIL) –  –
21
26
220  250 2.3 91 94 370
20 190 220 2.2 58 62 310
75th (UIL/LIL) – –
54
59
490  560
5.1
170 170 810
53 450 510 140 150 730
95th (UIL/LIL) – – 160  180 1200
1400
16
350 360 1900
1300 300 310 1800
Mean (UIL/LIL) – –
42  51 360 410 4.4 120 130 580
41 50 330 380 4.3 93 97 520
Max. (UIL/LIL) – – 310 310
2100  2400 27 560 580
3100
2000 2300 26 450 470
a There are no early effect costs except the small cost (<£1 × 103) for the maximum number of non-fatal reactions which is not shown.
b PACE currently costs all hereditary effects as occurring in the ﬁrst generation.
c The cost of cancer fatality is the sum of the incidence cost and the additional fatality cost.
d The percentile results of this column are derived independently and without reference to other percentile columns (See Section 4).
e The total health cost includes a very small contribution from a depreciated and excessively conservative estimate of early fatality and non-fatal
reaction costs.
Table 7 – The potential quantities of lost agriculture (assuming un-attenuated loss) and the corresponding economic
costs.
Sample percentile Agricultural production lost Total costa
Cow milk Green veg. Potatoes Grain Cattle meat Sheep meat
5th
(1.9  × 105 l) (1.4 × 106 kg) –  – (2.5 × 10
4 kg) (1.4 × 105 kg)
£0.067M £0.74M £0.16M £0.013M £2.2M
25th
(1.1 × 106 l) (3.5 × 106 kg) –  – (1.2 × 10
5 kg) (4.4 × 105 kg)
£0.38M £2.0M £0.69M £0.12M £9.1M
50th
(2.8 × 107 l) (8.1 × 106 kg) (2.8 × 106 kg) (2.4 × 106 kg) (8.1 × 105 kg) (1.0 × 106 kg)
£10M £4.4M £0.089M £0.67M £5.5M £0.47M £35M
75th
(9.2 × 107 l) (2.6 × 107 kg) (1.1 × 107 kg) (3.8 × 107 kg) (3.8 × 106 kg) (2.4 × 106 kg)
£33M £12M £1.5M £12M £27M £3.5M £130M
95th
(7.3 × 108 l) (6.8 × 107 kg) (4.7 × 107 kg) (4.0 × 108 kg) (2.6 × 107 kg) (1.6 × 107 kg)
£260M £33M £13M £130M £180M £23M £590M
Mean
(1.3 × 108 l) (1.9 × 107 kg) (1.0 × 107 kg) (6.1 × 107 kg) (4.9 × 106 kg) (3.0 × 106 kg)
£45M £9.2M £3.2M £18M £35M £6.9M £130M
Max.
(1.2 × 109 l) (9.6 × 107 kg) (1.7 × 108 kg) (9.8 × 108 kg) (7.8 × 107 kg) (3.7 × 107 kg)
£450M £47M £140M £300M £550M £330M £1200M
a The total agricultural costs include the value of lost production of dairy and beef cattle, sheep, cereals, potatoes, legumes, leafy green
vegetables, root vegetables, sugar beet, soft fruit and hard fruit.
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delected agricultural countermeasures that would need to be
eparately costed but are likely to reduce the cost of waste dis-
osal and restore some lands to agricultural production earlier
Public Health England, 2015).
.4.  Summary
able 8 summarises the range of costs likely to accrue from
riggering countermeasure actions based on either the lower
r upper intervention levels. Three observations can imme-
iately be drawn. First, there appears to be only a small
ifference between lower and upper ERLs over both the eco-nomic costs to businesses and people and also the health
costs. Second, health costs typically dominate over costs to
businesses and people. Third, between the 5th percentile and
95th percentile, the total cost increases by roughly two orders
of magnitude, with a further factor of two cost increase,
between 95th percentile and the maximum value recorded.
It is worth stressing that the costs are derived on the basis
of a “perfect” response to any implemented countermeasures
(i.e. the doses that people receive are known and are acted
upon appropriately, efﬁciently and with full compliance) albeit
with slight modiﬁcation in the instance of sheltering and
iodine prophylaxis, as described in Table 2. As indicated by the
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Table 8 – The major component costs of the accident under the application of alternative intervention levels. The table
includes results for the lower intervention level (shown in bold text) and the upper intervention level (shown in italicised
text) as described in Table 2.
Sample
percentile
Total economic cost to
business and people (£M)
Total cost of health effects (£M) Total cost to
agriculture (£M)
Total cost (£M)a
UIL LIL UIL LIL UIL&LIL UIL LIL
5th 0.41 5.0 64 43 2.2 74 58
25th 2.4 20 170 130 9.1 220 190
50th 12 51 370 310 35 450 430
75th 34 97 810 730 130 1100 1000
95th 390 470 1900 1800 590 2800 2800
Mean 96 140 580 520 130 800 780
Max. 4000 4000 3100 3100 1200 5100 5100
a The percentile results of this column are derived independently and without reference to other percentile columns.mean values shown in Table 8, the use of lower intervention
levels are likely to cost less overall by incurring lower health
costs although the immediate business costs will be higher.
The difference in this case is small and the cost balance may
change at sites with different distributions of population and
business activity.
As further described in Higgins and Sherwood (2017), the
95% conﬁdence interval for the 95th percentile total cost is
within the approximate range of £2.5 billion to £3.4 billion for
both the lower and upper intervention levels. Such conﬁdence
intervals are not an absolute measure of the total uncertainty
in the prediction, which would require a full uncertainty anal-
ysis, but instead reﬂect the consequences of using a limited
number of meteorological sequences together with the rate of
change in the total cost with percentile at high percentiles.
5.  Discussion
Whilst it is important to remember that the calculations have
been performed for a hypothetical nuclear reactor accident
(with a single, approximated source term) at a single, ﬁctitious
nuclear site, it is still possible to draw some inferences regard-
ing consequences and costs relevant to the UK. To assess the
implications of the results from the PACE and COCO-2 calcu-
lations, the discussion is structured in the following manner.
The present limitations of the calculations performed and the
present limitations with PACE and COCO-2 methodologies are
described in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. Section 5.3 compares the
hypothetical source term used in this study to the source
terms for the accidents at Chernobyl, Fukushima Dai-ichi,
and to that of a Gen III+ reactor, namely the European Pres-
surised Reactor (EPR). Finally, areas where PACE and COCO-2
may be used in the future, such as comparing results with
recent cost estimates for a hypothetical nuclear accident in
France and in an appraisal of the recent Swiss policy on iodine
pre-distribution are brieﬂy described in Section 5.4.
5.1.  Limitations  of  the  calculations  performed
The PACE calculation for a hypothetical nuclear reactor acci-
dent at a ﬁctitious nuclear site explored the effectiveness and
consequences of applying countermeasures based on the UK
ERLs. As the demography of the site is precise, the results of
this calculation cannot be transferred directly to other loca-
tions within the UK. In particular, most UK nuclear facilities
(including all operating and planned nuclear power reactors)
are on the coast; so the area of land affected by any poten-
tial accident is likely to be smaller although not necessarilysocially or economically less important. In any event, the
additional effects on marine life, including seafood, are not
included in the scenario considered. Similarly, the conse-
quences will depend on the isotopic composition of the source
term, which is based on generic aspects of an accident to a
nuclear reactor. Variations in the timing of release and isotopic
composition of the material released could lead to signiﬁcant
differences: for example, iodine is unlikely to be of concern for
non-reactor accidents, so that iodine prophylaxis would not
be needed and would not be considered. To this end, and in
common with all PSA systems, each of the component mod-
els used by PACE relies on the best estimate results derived
at earlier model stages. Evaluating the uncertainties and cor-
relations associated with each of the hundreds of parameter
values used in these speciﬁc calculations goes well beyond
the remit of this study. The results can be presented in several
ways, and to some extent the intended use of the results will
inﬂuence how this is done. The full use of the model, with a
probabilistic distribution of source terms, as well as meteorol-
ogy and behaviour of people is, of course, possible but is well
beyond the scope of this study. In any modelling there will be
uncertainties, both aleatoric and epistemic, and the value of
using the models must take these aspects into account. Using
a mean value as a risk metric is one approach, but it must be
compared with a target based on the same assumptions—it
has no actual meaning without being set within the assump-
tions made. Upper and lower bounds, with conﬁdence levels
if they can be estimated, can provide guidance on the range of
possible consequences. With these caveats, the results provide
a broad understanding of the range of costs that may arise.
5.2.  Present  limitations  of  the  PACE  and  COCO-2
methodologies
The PACE model, including the COCO-2 economic model, pro-
vides a wide-ranging picture of the expected consequences
of a nuclear accident. The consequences and the context in
which they arise are constrained by the parameters of the
case study, in particular, the selection of the ﬁctitious nuclear
site and the use of a restricted source term that only con-
siders a few of the isotopes that could be released. However,
independent of the constraints of the case study the eco-
nomic assessment is not entirely complete; as discussed in
the COCO-2 report (Higgins et al., 2008) there may be aspects
of an accident that are difﬁcult to fully or even partially quan-
tify and these are not currently captured within the PACE
assessment. For example, COCO-2, as a cost model for off-
site consequences, does not consider the capital loss at the
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Table 9 – Comparison of the source term used in this work to the source terms for the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi
and Chernobyl.
Radionuclide Activity (Bq)
Fictitious UK accident Fukushima Dai-ichi (UNSCEAR)a Chernobyl (OECD)b
134Cs 1.5 × 1015 9.0 × 1015 1.6 × 1017
136Cs – 1.8 × 1015 9.9 × 1016
137Cs 1.0 × 1015 8.8 × 1015 2.6 × 1017
132Te 1.0 × 1016 2.9 × 1016 3.9 × 1018
131I 1.0 × 1017 1.2 × 1017 2.9 × 1018
132I 1.5 × 1017 2.9 × 1016 –
133I – 9.6 × 1015 –
133Xe 1.2 × 1019 7.3 × 1018 6.6 × 1018
90Sr 1.0 × 1014 – 2.0 × 1017
238–240Pu – ∼1 × 109 3.4 × 1015
a Data taken from Table 2 of UNSCEAR (2014).
b Values shown are averaged from data published in Devell et al. (1995).
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rite of an accident or any associated clean-up costs. Addition-
lly, no impact is assumed on other power production facilities
nd ultimately the cost of electricity even though, following a
arge accident, the Ofﬁce for Nuclear Regulation might require
 safety review of nuclear reactors elsewhere in the country
hat could conceivably lead to reactors being temporarily or
ermanently closed.
Any public response associated with political and social
onsiderations might well depend on proximity to the stricken
lant. On the other hand, widespread concerns within the
opulation at large could lead to additional costs in terms of
edical services (including mental health costs) and clean-
p requirements. The resulting purchasing decisions made to
ssuage public concerns would be on top of the costs predicted
y PACE.
One area of particular concern not accounted for above is
he consequence to the UK economy from a possible decline in
nternational visitor numbers and their discretionary spend-
ng following a major accident. The assumption of COCO-2
s that the economy as a whole recovers rapidly. Empirical
vidence is limited but Wu and Hayashi (2014) indicate that
nbound tourism recovered rapidly despite Japan experienc-
ng both a nuclear accident and large-scale structural damage
long the Eastern seaboard following the Great East Japan
arthquake of 2011.
.3.  Comparison  of  the  accidents  at  Chernobyl  and
ukushima  Dai-ichi
s seen in Table 9, the source term for the hypothetical UK
ccident considered in this study is not as severe as the source
erms for the accidents at Chernobyl and Fukushima Dai-ichi.
evertheless, the source term is realistic for a potential severe
uclear accident at a modern nuclear power plant, as illus-
rated in Fig. 5, which shows the cumulative probability of
 large nuclear accident for a Gen III+ European Pressurised
eactor (a type that being constructed in Finland, France, and
hina; and planned for the UK) as a function of its radiological
elease. With the exception of 133Xe, which is overestimated
o provide an approximate surrogate for the effects of the
ther short-lived nuclides released, the release considered in
his work would be similar to an event with a frequency of
0−7–10−8 per reactor year.
As the source term is less severe, a certain degree of care
s needed in comparing this release (and the response to this
elease) with the releases at Chernobyl and Fukushima Dai-ichi. However, it is interesting to highlight the differences
between the numbers of people affected by these different
accidents. It should be noted that the release timescales were
different in these cases and differ from that in the analysed
source term. At Chernobyl the release was immediate and con-
tinued for several days, whereas at Fukushima Dai-ichi the
initial release was some hours after the event from the ﬁrst
reactor and then there were additional releases from two fur-
ther reactors over several days. The source term used in this
work assumes a relatively early release at two  hours (com-
pared with predictions for modern designs such as the EPR
for which it is predicted in nearly 95% of fault sequences the
containment would survive for more  than 24 h (AREVA and
EDF Energy, 2012), and to only last for only a short period
of a few hours. The time before a release is fundamental in
implementing early countermeasures effectively.
As mentioned in the report of the International Cher-
nobyl Project (IAEA, 1991), the initial decision to evacuate was
based on an individual receiving 100 mSv  absorbed dose dur-
ing the ﬁrst year after the accident. However, the decision
to evacuate Pripyat and nearby villages was made 36 h after
the accident, where decision making was made on limited
radiological data. Five days after the accident, the evacua-
tion zone was expanded to a radius of 10 km,  and was then
expanded the next day to a radius of 30 km,  which took four
days to evacuate. Thereafter, an absorbed dose rate map  was
drawn up with the following isopleths: 0.2 mGy/h formed the
boundary of the prohibited zone (about 1100 km2 in area),
0.05 mGy/h formed evacuation zone boundary (3000 km2) and
0.03 mGy/h formed the strict controlled zone (8000 km2). The
long-term relocation policy for those living within the vicinity
of Chernobyl was based on limiting the overall lifetime dose to
350 mSv  per person. The decision on whether to relocate peo-
ple was translated into an operational criterion of whether
the 137Cs equivalent ground contamination level was above
1480 kBq/m2 (or above 555 kBq/m2 for pregnant women and
families with children under 12). Following a relocation of
115,000 people in 1986, a further 220,000 people were relo-
cated in 1990, making a total of 335,000. Waddington et al.
(2017a) have suggested that signiﬁcantly fewer people should
have been relocated following the accident at Chernobyl. This
suggestion is based on the results of a J-value analysis, a tech-
nique based on economic utility theory and life-quality index
that can be used to assess the cost-effectiveness of accident
countermeasures.
108  Process Safety and Environmental Protection 1 1 2 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 96–113
Fig. 5 – Comparison of the releases associated with this work (black dashed line), the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi (blue
dashed line), and the accident at Chernobyl (red dashed line) to the results of a Level-2 Probabilistic Safety Assessment for
the European Pressurised Reactor (black solid line). Data for the source term and release probabilities for the EPR are taken
 (201from Table 4 (Subsection 15.4.4.3) of AREVA and EDF Energy
The evacuation policy at Fukushima Dai-ichi was based on
ﬁxed radial distances from the centre of the damaged plant. In
the ﬁrst instance, those living within 0–20 km were ordered to
evacuate to temporary shelters; followed by a voluntary order
for those living in the band 20–30 km from the site to evacuate.
In total, over 160,000 people were evacuated from the vicin-
ity of Fukushima Dai-ichi and ∼110,000 of these people were2).
from areas that had restrictions imposed on them (Ranghieri
and Ishiwatari, 2014). On April 21, the Government of Japan
established a “Deliberate Evacuation Area” that included areas
where the projected dose criterion of 20 mSv  received within
the ﬁrst year of the accident might be exceeded, with an order
for people to be relocated from this area within one month
after its issuance (Government of Japan, 2011). This extended
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Fig. 6 – Status, as of April 2014, of areas where evacuation orders have been issued following the accident at Fukushima
Dai-ichi. The arc labelled “20 km”  shows the 20 km radial distance from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant. Figure
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daken from Ministry for Economy, Trade and Industry (2014)
art of the evacuation areas out toward ∼50 km.  As shown
n Fig. 6, most of the vicinity surrounding the nuclear power
lant is still considered as a restricted area. It is estimated that
48,000 people who  lived in the restricted area have moved
utside of the Fukushima prefecture (Fukushima on the Globe,
014).
Therefore, it is interesting to compare Fig. 6 with that
hown in Fig. 4 on the estimated timescale of relocation;
oting that for the current UK calculations, short-term, “tem-
orary” relocation (under 90 days) dominates over long-term,
permanent” relocation. From Table 3, even at the 95th per-
entile, ∼36,000 people would need temporary relocation
hereas ∼2300 people would need permanent relocation fol-
owing the release from the hypothetical nuclear reactor
onsidered in this work. The mean number of people relocated
ermanently from this severe hypothetical nuclear accident is
620, based on a no-return criterion of 10 mSv  per year deter-
ined three months after the end of the emergency phase.6
6 More people would be able to return if the decision was
elayed until a year or two years after the accident.However, it should be noted that the 10 mSv  per year crite-
rion employed in the PACE calculation assumes normal living
and not the potential dose received from being permanently
outside. This dose is expected to decline with time through
the combination of radioactive decay, weathering, and the
migration of radioactivity through the soil. It is generally rep-
resented by an initially dominant short-term component, with
a characteristic time of a few years, in combination with a
longer term residual component, with a characteristic time
constant of a few tens of years. This combination is represen-
tative of the decay of the short-lived radionuclides initially
present superimposed on the more  gradual decline of longer-
lived radionuclides, principally 137Cs (Golikov et al., 2002).
Using CLEARE program (Change of Life Expectancy due to
Atomic Radiation Exposure) based on the extended Marshall
model (Marshall et al., 1983; Thomas et al., 2006, 2007; Jones
et al., 2007b,c; Jones and Thomas, 2009; Thomas and Jones,
2009), a dose of 10 mSv  per year for 50 years will reduce the
life expectancy of the affected population in the UK by about
four and a half months—this reduction in life expectancy is
not inconsequential and is thought to be that experienced by
110  Process Safety and Environmental Protection 1 1 2 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 96–113the average Londoner (Darzi, 2014) as a result of the capital’s
air pollution (nine months at birth). The mean increase in can-
cer incidence expected to occur over the decades following the
accident and reported in Table 3 for the lower intervention
level (2000) is a small fraction of the 357,000 cases that occur
annually in the UK (Cancer Research UK, 2017) so that even
in areas where higher doses were received any increase may
be difﬁcult to detect and separate from the confounding, but
beneﬁcial, effects of enhanced screening.
It is also noted that non-nuclear related accidents can also
lead to large numbers of people requiring evacuation. For
instance, 1.5 million people, aged 16 and above, were evacu-
ated from their homes in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama
in August 2005 due to Hurricane Katrina; ∼410,000 people
(29%) had not returned home ﬁfteen months after this natural
disaster (Groen and Polikov, 2008). The 1979 Mississauga Train
Derailment led to more  than 213,000–226,000 people being
evacuated for six days at a total cost of C$22.5–24.5 million
(Burton et al., 1981). Using a World Bank deﬂator of 2.42 to
convert 1979 CAD to 2004 CAD (World Bank, 2017) and a Pur-
chasing Power Parity (PPP) factor of 0.56 to convert from 2004
CAD to 2004 GBP (OECD, 2017), the evacuation costs spanned
£30.4–33.1 million in 2004 GBP. This would imply that the cost
per person evacuated in the Mississauga Train Derailment,
including lost income, spans £134–155 cf. short-term accom-
modation costs of £79 per person for the mean case from
Tables 3 and 4. Whilst such comparisons are inexact, it is
indicative that the Mississauga Train Derailment evacuation
costs are of a similar order of magnitude to that predicted for
the hypothetical nuclear accident in the UK.
In summary, it is noted from Table 8 that for an idealised
response to the hypothetical nuclear accident in the UK, the
economic costs associated with health for both the lower and
upper intervention levels dominate over the economic costs
to people and businesses; and that the sum of these val-
ues plus agriculture costs lead to an estimated total cost of
less than £3 billion at the 95th percentile. By implementing
expensive interventions, such as long-term relocation, there
is the potential for a signiﬁcant imbalance between the addi-
tional economic costs of these actions compared to the health
costs that are saved. This can be further exacerbated by the
psychological and physical trauma of relocation, which has
been found to lead to premature deaths amongst the elderly
(Murakami et al., 2015). On the other hand, psychological
trauma and additional health costs might occur amongst peo-
ple not relocated from areas affected by the release, especially
if they were worried about their on-going risk from radiation
and were unsure that it was small.
5.4.  Potential  future  PACE  and  COCO-2  calculations
Since the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi, researchers at the
Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN) have
performed calculations to ascertain the cost of a potential
nuclear accident occurring in France (Pascucci-Cahen and
Momal, 2012, 2013). The calculations by IRSN suggest that
for a similar radionuclide release a much higher cost may
be borne than those calculated in this work. Given the dif-
ferences between the calculation methodologies, a detailed
like-for-like comparison is not yet possible but this could be
explored in the future.
Also, Switzerland has revised its emergency preparedness
plans such that stable iodine tablets are now pre-distributed
to 50 km from each of their nuclear power stations, which cov-ers 4.6 million people, at a cost of US$31 million (Bosley and
Bennett, 2014).
If the same pre-distribution plan was considered in this
work, then ∼3.5 million sets of iodine tablets would need to be
distributed. However, as shown in Table 4, for the hypothetical
nuclear accident with the lowest intervention levels the num-
ber of people who would require to take stable iodine would
range from 89,000 (5th percentile) to 810,000 (95th percentile).
This compares to 1500 people (5th percentile) to 140,000 peo-
ple (95th percentile) who would require stable iodine at the
higher intervention level.
Paying regard to the size of the accident considered (as
highlighted in Table 9) and its very low probability (as detailed
in Fig. 5), as well as the evidence for targeting stable iodine pre-
distribution to speciﬁc demographics (i.e. to those under 40)
(National Research Council, 2004), it is not clear that blanket
pre-distribution of stable iodine to 50 km is the most cost-
effective countermeasure. However, this is not an entirely
conclusive suggestion, as a more  complete and speciﬁc cost-
beneﬁt analysis surrounding stable iodine distribution, and
the efﬁcacy of such distribution, is needed. The results from
this PACE calculation indicate that it is feasible to further
analyse this issue; and we note the results of such calcula-
tions may subsequently be used in a J-value analysis (e.g. see
Waddington et al. (2017a) and references therein) to assess the
cost-beneﬁt relationship.
As mentioned in Higgins et al. (2008), the cost of stable
iodine production and distribution is not included within the
COCO-2 costing methodology, as it is generally considered as
a sunk cost of the licensing conditions and not a cost arising
from the event. Given the potential for countries to adopt very
precautionary stable iodine pre-distribution plans, the costs
may be worth including in future versions of this code.
It may be tempting to compare the relative size of the exclu-
sion zone in this work (the red and orange zone in Fig. 4) to
the exclusion zone surrounding Fukushima Dai-ichi. However,
such a comparison is invalid due to the differences in source
term, demographics, and in particular the idealised response
to the accident provided by PACE. A study by Waddington
et al. (2017a) focussing on some aspects of accident response
has suggested that the responses of the authorities after both
Chernobyl and Fukushima Dai-ichi may have been exagger-
ated. A further study (Waddington et al., 2017b) also considers
the efﬁcacy of a number of remediation measures instituted
after the Chernobyl and Fukushima Dai-ichi accidents. Uncer-
tainty at the time decisions are made and the need to reassure
the population are key to understanding why more actions
may be taken than required by a post-hoc cost-beneﬁt analy-
sis. Further work is required to understand the consequences
of slow or exaggerated responses on the short- and long-term
wellbeing of the population and the eventual cost commit-
ment.
The PACE program considers various remediation tech-
niques to minimise long-term dose rates; and we  observe that
the efﬁcacy of remediating an affected area is reliant on the
area being accessible (i.e. the rate of remediation may well
be slower in a larger area with more  people evacuated than
it is in a smaller area with fewer people evacuated). A further
study to assess remediation rates and their effect on long-term
relocation would be needed to assess this.
Finally, the efﬁcacy of countermeasures depends on the
ability to provide off-site support, including transport both
to the site and from the surrounding area, so assump-
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-ions of their effectiveness are important. As the accident at
ukushima Dai-ichi has demonstrated, countermeasures can
e compromised if the accident is initiated by external hazards
hich also affect the surrounding area. External hazards also
an affect several facilities on a site at the same time which
an complicate countermeasures and affect on-site recovery.
hese are issues which need further consideration in devel-
ping emergency preparedness arrangements.
.  Conclusion
his paper has sought to determine the indicative costs of a
evere nuclear accident occurring within the UK by assessing
 hypothetical release from a ﬁctitious nuclear power plant
ite that has a realistic demography. These indicative costs
ere determined by using the economic cost model COCO-2
oupled to the UK’s most up-to-date Level-3 PSA code PACE.
his paper has brieﬂy outlined various Level-3 PSA codes and
orresponding economic costing models that are in operation
round the world. A brief introduction to the PACE code, and
he rationale behind the source term, weather conditions, and
he implementation of countermeasures based on UK ERLs
re provided. The source term is smaller than either that from
he Chernobyl or Fukushima Dai-ichi accidents and its tempo-
al extent is far shorter. Nevertheless, it falls roughly within
he spectrum of very unlikely releases (within the range of
 × 10−7–1 × 10−8 events per reactor year) that could occur due
o an accident at a modern nuclear power plant site.
As observed with the variation in economic costs over mul-
iple trials, the effects on people and the environment vary
reatly depending on the weather at the time of the accident,
hich emphasises the beneﬁt from running multiple simula-
ions to determine the distribution and likelihoods of these
ffects. Two intervention levels based on the lower and upper
ntervention levels of the UK ERLs were considered. Little dif-
erence was seen between the overall total costs for the various
ercentile ranges, with greater disruption costs in the lower
ntervention level matching greater health costs in the upper.
Whilst the accident model contains a large number of
ssumptions and idealisations, as explained, the mean out-
urn suggests that the number of people needing to be
ermanently relocated in the case of a severe, short-duration
elease accident at a modern nuclear reactor in the UK would
e relatively small, possibly less than a thousand, based solely
n the reduction of physical harm from potential radiation
xposure. This contrasts sharply with the observed num-
ers of those relocated by the authorities at Chernobyl and
ukushima Dai-ichi, which was at least an order of magnitude
reater in each case.
The study has shown that there can be a large variation in
he possible costs imposed by a severe nuclear reactor acci-
ent. In the case considered here, the cost was estimated to
e several billion pounds in some instances. However, even in
he worst calculated case, the scale of costs is estimated to be
etween one and two orders of magnitude down on the costs
ncurred so far as a result of the approach taken at Fukushima
ai-ichi. The extent to which this would be true for an actual
ccident of the scale of Fukushima at a real reactor site in the
K is of course impossible to derive from these results. They
hould in no way be taken as indicative of the UK situation,
n the sense that it is an open question as to how far it is
nevitable that additional costs would be incurred in the case
f a major nuclear accident over and above those consideredin this paper, by the public demanding a greater effort driven
by a lack of conﬁdence in the response provided.
The results show that the PACE and COCO-2 models can be
useful in determining the potential costs of accidents and the
nature of the emergency preparedness arrangements needed.
The use of these models for an actual reactor at a chosen
site would be a valuable addition to the understanding of the
effects of a nuclear accident in such a situation.
Further examination using PACE and COCO-2 of the recent
cost estimates in France and the recent policy stance on
the pre-distribution of iodine in Switzerland might provide
valuable insights. In particular, further work on whether
unavoidable intangible costs have been accurately assessed
or how other intangible losses may be avoided by appropriate
pre-emptive management actions would be beneﬁcial.
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